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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
S78-2a-3(2)(i) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. The trial court did not err in its determination of contempt and sanctions nor did it 
err in exercising jurisdiction in this matter as this proceeding is a matter of contempt 
and sanctions and not one of custody. 
The decision to hold a party in contempt rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will 
not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court's action is so unreasonable as to be classified as 
capricious and arbitrary, or a clear abuse of discretion. Marsh v. Marsh, 973 P. 2d 988 (Utah App. 
1999). Here, the decision to hold Mrs. Barton in contempt was not done capriciously. Her refusal 
to cooperate with the Special Master despite the provisions in the Divorce Decree and her failure to 
appear at the August 11 hearing, despite being noticed of the hearing, demonstrates her wilful and 
continuous disregard for the judicial process. Furthermore, there can be no argument that the court 
abused its discretion as evidenced by the fact that Mrs. Barton was given time (60 days) to comply 
with the court order before sanctions were imposed and yet, she—once again—wilfully ignored the 
court order. 
II. The trial court did not err in exercising jurisdiction since Petitioner had already been 
found in contempt and the trial court was only addressing the issue of sanctions. 
Judge Harding made it clear that he would only entertain matters regarding contempt and the 
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imposition of sanctions. Judge Harding said: 
In regards to the makeup visitation I want the order to reflect 
clearly that I do not believe I have jurisdiction further to enter 
orders regarding makeup visitation, that my order in no way deals 
with the makeup visitation to which Mr. Burrows' client may be entitled, 
and that I'm referring that matter to the special master and court in 
California for determination and adjudication." (Transcript, October 
18 page 143). 
The matter addressed before this court was one of contempt and sanctions and the trial court was 
well within its powers to adjudicate it. 
III. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its imposition of sanctions against 
Petitioner due to Petitioner's wilful and continuous refusal to comply with court 
orders. 
The trial court inquired as to Petitioner's financial status in awarding Respondent fees and costs due 
to Petitioner's wilful disobedience and disregard of court orders. The decision to hold Petitioner in 
contempt was based on her continued refusal to cooperate in the judicial process. It was not done 
capriciously or arbitrarily. Petitioner decided not to cooperate with the Special Master. Petitioner 
decided not to attend the hearing in Utah and was, subsequently, found in contempt. The judge gave 
her 60 days in which to remedy the situation and comply with the court order. Petitioner decided, 
once again, to ignore the court order. Petitioner's disobedience and wilful disregard precipitated the 
contempt order and the imposition of sanctions. 
IV. The trial court did not err in excluding hearsay testimony meant to justify Petitioner's 
actions when evidence demonstrates Petitioner's knowingly and wilfully violated the 
contempt order. 
2 
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Barker. Mr. Barton paid Dr. Barker's fees in its entirety to expedite the process. Mrs. Barton, on 
the other hand, did little to cooperate with the Special Master and did little to facilitate Mr. Barton's 
visitation with his children. After the visitation and non cooperation became unbearable, Mr. Barton 
sought assistance from the courts. On July 19, 1999, Mr. Barton obtained an Order to Show Cause 
regarding contempt which scheduled a hearing for August 11, 1999. An Affidavit filed by Mr. 
Barton detailed his visitation problems with Mrs. Barton. Mrs. Barton did not appear at the hearing 
but filed an Affidavit (Record 406-388) responding to the claims and making counter arguments. 
Mrs. Barton also filed an Ex parte order in an attempt to have California take emergency jurisdiction. 
This action was denied on all four (4) grounds raised by Petitioner. 
At the August 11 hearing, Judge Lynn Davis found Mrs. Barton in contempt of court for 
failing to "appear on this date after having been properly and personally served, and for her... failure 
to comply with the decree or the addendum to the decree." (Transcript, August 11 page 31). Judge 
Davis ordered Mrs. Barton to pay $1397.00 for travel, wage loss, and attorney's fees and costs. 
Judge Davis reserved the issue of sanctions for contempt for 60 days in order to give Mrs. Barton 
time to comply with the Divorce Decree. 
Mrs. Barton, once again, tried unsuccessfully to transfer jurisdiction to California. On 
September 7, 1999, Mrs. Barton was admonished by the Honorable Glen M. Reiser: 
I think the Utah Court has jurisdiction at this point. But 
they also have contempt powers, and I think its incumbent on 
your client to recognize that. If she doesn't want to go to jail in 
Utah she ought to think about that." (Transcript, 
September 7 page 13). 
Per the 60 day grace period, stemming from the August 11 hearing, a sanctions hearing was 
held on October 18, 1999. Judge Harding found Mrs. Barton had not complied with the provisions 
4 
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outlined in her contempt hearing and sanctioned her with incarceration for two (2) days and imposed 
fees and costs of $3,631.88. Prior to this, California and Utah courts conferred, transferring 
jurisdiction to California with regards to all issues except contempt and sanctions. (Record 447). 
To date, Mrs. Barton has not paid the monetary judgement. Mrs. Barton now brings this appeal. 
This case is quite clear. Utah has jurisdiction over matters regarding contempt and sanctions and 
properly imposed sanctions against Mrs. Barton for her contempt of court. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Utah court exercised appropriate jurisdiction. The parties were, indeed, divorced in Utah 
by bifurcated decree entered on April 9,1997. (Record 59-58) and Mrs. Barton moved to California 
on or around August 15,1997. However, Mr. Barton remained domiciled in Utah but took extended 
contract work in California in order to facilitate visitation without disruption in the children's lives. 
The Addendum to the divorce decree provides that: 
A.(iv) The Fourth District Court of Utah, State of Utah, shall 
maintain jurisdiction of this case until a Special Master/Interventionist 
in California is established and agreed upon between the parties. 
The Special Master will act as a child advocate and an arbitrator on 
behalf of the children and will be able to work with each parent to 
improve the parties' post divorce relationship. (Record 323-322). 
Here, the Special Master had been designated and Mr. Barton paid the fees and began cooperating 
with him. Mrs. Barton, on the other hand, was not cooperating with the Special Master. She would 
not return phone calls and she did not make appointments. In fact, it has been established that her 
tone towards the Special Master was belligerent and non cooperative. The Special Master had been 
designated, but arguably, Mrs. Barton's actions could be viewed as a direct rejection of his services. 
In which case, the Special Master had not yet been "established and agreed upon by both parties" 
5 
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and Mr. Barton's attempt to enforce the divorce decree was properly heard by the Utah Courts. 
The Federal Parental Kidnaping Act does not apply in this case since Mr. Barton was still 
a Utah resident at the time of the contempt proceeding. The court, then, exercised appropriate 
jurisdiction. 
The court's rulings were appropriate. Judge Davis inquired as to Mrs. Barton's financial 
condition. The judge inquired as to her salary, her support payments, and her monthly expenses 
before making his decision. Mrs. Barton was allowed time to comply with the court order. She did 
not comply with the court order. Mrs. Barton's wilful disregard of existing court orders precipitated 
the judge's rulings. In light of Mrs. Barton's conduct and behavior, the ruling was appropriate. The 
trial court also properly excluded testimony meant to justify Mrs. Barton's actions. The testimony 
was excluded based on rules governing hearsay. Assuming arguendo that Mrs. Barton was allowed 
to introduce hearsay evidence meant to establish some justification for her actions, she can only do 
so by a showing of good faith. Mrs. Barton knowingly disregarded the court order. She attempted 
to have California exercise emergency jurisdiction to avoid any punishment for her action. She 
wilfully disregarded the contempt order and continues to attempt to shirk from accepting 
responsibility for her actions. Due to Mrs. Barton's actions, the ruling to exclude hearsay evidence 
was proper. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT EXERCISED APPROPRIATE JURISDICTION. 
A. The Agreement Regarding a Special Master Set Out in the Divorce Decree Had Not 
Been Met. 
6 
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First and foremost, it has been established that the proceedings that have led to this appeal 
were for contempt and sanctions and not regarding custody. The Addendum to the Divorce Decree 
provides that: 
A.(iv) The Fourth District Court of Utah, State of Utah, shall 
maintain jurisdiction of this case until a Special Master/Interventionist 
in California is established and agreed upon between the parties. 
The Special Master will act as a child advocate and an arbitrator on 
behalf of the children and will be able to work with each parent to 
improve the parties' post divorce relationship. (Record 323-322). 
A Special Master had been designated but was not established and was not functioning in working 
"with each parent to improve the parties' post divorce relationship" as indicated in the Addendum. 
Arguably, the Special Master had not been established and agreed upon by both parties since Mrs. 
Barton was not cooperating with him. Appellant argues: "A court's initial inquiry should always be 
to determine whether it has jurisdiction to determine a controversy." (Appellants Brief, page 11 
quoting Otteson v. State, 945 P. 2d 170, 171 (Utah App. 1997). At the August 11 hearing, Judge 
Davis did inquire as to whether Utah had jurisdiction. After reading relevant portions of the Divorce 
Decree, the judge said: 
If it says Utah shall maintain jurisdiction of this case 
until a special master interventionist in California is established, 
and that in fact has been established or to have been established then 
it was, I don't know whether it was the judges belief that once that 
occurred Utah has no further jurisdiction." (Transcript, 
August 11, 1999 page 8-9). 
The argument was raised that in essence the Special Master has not been established because in Mrs. 
Barton's correspondence she has said that she didn't acknowledge the Special Master. She even 
attempted to have California take emergency jurisdiction and California denied that request. Why 
would she do that if she believed jurisdiction had already transferred to California? After the 
7 
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judge's inquiry, the judge decided Utah maintained jurisdiction to hear the matter. Mr. Barton 
brought this action in a Utah court because the provisions of the Divorce Decree, specifically the 
provision regarding cooperation with the Special Master, were not being met. Having properly 
established jurisdiction, the court exercised appropriate jurisdiction in finding Mrs. Barton in 
contempt of court for failure to appear at the hearing and for failure to comply with the decree or the 
Addendum to the divorce Decree. 
B. The PKPA Does Not Affect Jurisdiction in This Matter. 
The Parental Kidnaping Protection Act (PKPA) provides for jurisdiction. In this case, the PKPA 
does not apply since Mr. Barton had not moved from Utah. At the time of the contempt hearing, Mr. 
Barton did work in California but his primary place of residence was Utah. He owned property in 
Utah and not in California. He paid his insurance in Utah. All in all, Mr. Barton was a Utah 
resident. Liska v. Liska, cited in Appellant's brief, states "Jurisdiction remain in the decree state as 
long as one parent continues to reside in the original state and maintains some contact with the 
child." 902 P. 2d 644 (Utah App. 1995) quoting Rawlings v. Weiner. 752 P. 2d 1327,1330-31 (Utah 
App.) (Bench, J. Concurring), cert, denied, 765 P. 2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
Utah retained jurisdiction. Even if the PKPA does preempt State law, it does not apply here 
since Mr. Barton was a Utah resident at the time of the contempt proceeding. Utah Code Ann. 78-
45c-3 is not disturbed. All of the cases cited in Appellant's brief discuss jurisdiction when all parties 
have moved from the decree state. This is simply not the case here. The PKPA does not apply and 
the Utah Court exercised appropriate jurisdiction in this matter. 
C. The Trial Court Exercised Appropriate Jurisdiction Per an Agreement Between the 
California and Utah Courts. 
8 
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Utah had jurisdiction to hear the contempt and sanctions proceedings per an agreement 
between the Utah and California courts. On September 28,1999, Commissioner Pattie in California 
and Judge Ray M. Harding in Utah conferred regarding jurisdiction. The courts agreed: 
The [Utah] Court rules that it will hear the contempt matter currently 
set for October 18, 1999, at 3 PM. All other issues, including custody 
and visitation, are to be heard by the California court. (Record 447). 
There can be no question of jurisdiction. In Liska v. Liska, the court states: 
Until Utah declined to exercise jurisdiction, the Colorado court was 
without power to unilaterally assume jurisdiction over this case, unless 
it did so on an emergency basis. 902 P. 2d 644 (Utah App. 1995) 
quoting State ex. rel. D.S.K. v. Kasper, 792 P. 2d 118. 123 
(Utah App. 1990). 
Despite Mrs. Barton's attempts, California would not take emergency jurisdiction in this matter. 
Mrs. Barton cannot use the legal system to avoid being held responsible for her disobedience in 
complying with court orders. 
D. The Court Properly Ruled in This Matter. 
The court did make inquiries as to whether the Special Master had been established. The 
court also heard testimony as to the failure on the part of Mrs. Barton to cooperate with the Special 
Master. The court heard testimony of Mrs. Barton's failure to comply with visitation provisions in 
the Divorce Decree. The court also heard testimony of Mrs. Barton's rejection of the Special Master. 
The court also heard testimony that Mr. Barton was finding it impossible to enforce the Divorce 
Decree due to Mrs. Barton's wilful disregard for its provisions. The court also noted Mrs. Barton's 
failure to appear for the hearing and was aware that she had attempted to have California take 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
emergency jurisdiction in this matter. With all of this information in hand, the court properly ruled 
in this matter. 
POINT II 
MRS. BARTON ACTED IN BAD FAITH REGARDING COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
CONTEMPT ORDER AND THE COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED TESTIMONY 
MEANT TO JUSTIFY HER ACTIONS. 
On August 11,1999, Mrs. Barton was found in contempt of court. At the hearing, the judge 
found her 
in contempt of court as it relates to her failure to appear on this date 
after having been properly and personally served, and for her...failure 
to comply with the decree or the addendum to the decree. (Transcript, 
August 11 page 31). 
In an attempt to afford Mrs. Barton time to remedy the situation and avoid a penalty, the judge said 
that he would 
reserve the issue of...a penalty or, the imposition of incarceration pending 
a review of her compliance with the order. It won't purge it but...I will 
hold it in reserve for 60 days...(Transcript, August 11 page 32). 
Since the order was issued, Mrs. Barton has done nothing to comply with it. In fact, she has done 
everything in her power to keep the children from Mr. Barton and has not cooperated with the 
Special Master. At the contempt hearing held on October 18, 1999, Mrs. Barton attempted to 
explain why she had not appeared at the August 11 hearing and why she has continued to deny 
visitation to Mr. Barton. Much of this explanation was stating advice supposedly given her by 
others, namely her California counsel. Judge Harding appropriately denied such testimony as 
hearsay. Utah Rules of Evidence 801 (c) states: hearsay is limited to statements "offered in evidence 
to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Appellant cites State v. Sorenson in arguing the evidence 
10 
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should have been admitted. State v. Sorenson states: 
When an out of court statement is offered simply to prove that it was 
made, without regard to whether it is true, such testimony is not proscribed 
by the hearsay rule." 617 P. 2d 333 (Utah 1980). 
Sorenson further states, "Evidence of a statement by a third person is therefore admissible, 
irrespective of the fact that it was made out of court, if it is offered to support a defense of good 
faith." In the case at hand, Mrs. Barton cannot make a good faith defense. The evidence justifying 
Mrs. Barton's actions was properly excluded since her actions prior to the contempt hearing and after 
the hearing, demonstrate she clearly had no intention of complying with the divorce decree or the 
contempt order. Mrs. Barton comes to the table with unclean hands. She is seeking to have her 
actions made in bad faith explained away by introducing hearsay evidence that is only admissible 
to support a good faith defense. This course of action was properly not allowed by the Judge 
Harding. Mrs. Barton's actions prior to and after the contempt hearing demonstrate her hostility 
towards Mr. Barton and her desire to make visitation and communication with the children difficult, 
if not impossible, for him. 
Mellor v. Cook also cited in Appellant's brief discussed the exclusion of testimony 
demonstrating reliance on advice of counsel, where defendant manifested an attitude of knowing and 
wilful disobedience of the court order. 597 P. 2d 882 (Utah 1979). Once again, Mrs. Barton 
knowingly disregarded the court order. Mrs. Barton knew the duty imposed upon her by the court 
order as evidenced by the ex parte orders requesting emergency jurisdiction which she filed in 
California prior to the August 11 hearing. Mrs. Barton was not prejudiced by the exclusion of 
testimony justifying her actions because she wilfully and knowingly violated the court order. 
Moreover, she has no good faith defense as evidenced by her actions warranting the contempt 
11 
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hearing. The exclusion of such testimony did not prejudice Mrs. Barton in any way. Rehn v. Rehn, 
974 P. 2d 306 (Utah App. 1999). 
POINT III 
THE CONTEMPT FINDING WAS APPROPRIATE IN LIGHT OF MRS. BARTON'S 
BLATANT DISREGARD FOR THE JUDICIAL PROCESS. 
In Thomas v. Thomas. 569 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1977), it states: "When a proper order or 
judgment has been made, one who stands in wilful defiance or disobedience thereof may be found 
in contempt of court and punished by imprisonment." Mrs. Barton wilfully defied the court order 
and was, subsequently, found in contempt. Further, Judge Davis afforded her 60 days in which to 
comply with the court order. Once again, Mrs. Barton refused to comply. Appellant contends that 
neither Judge Davis nor Judge Harding inquired as to Mrs. Barton's finances and ability to pay. This 
contention is incorrect. Judge Harding went into some detail regarding Mrs. Barton's salary, living 
expenses and support payments (See, Transcript, October 18 page 22-23). Furthermore, Appellant 
attempted to offer testimony of a recent bankruptcy and the financial conditions that led to that 
bankruptcy to which Judge Harding responded: 
...you probably know this court well enough to know that's not 
going to make a difference in my decision. It may feel good to your 
client to be able to state that but it's not going to make any 
difference to me. (Transcript, October 18 page 52). 
Appellant's attorney then stated: 
No. And, we only bring that out for the purpose, Your Honor, of 
showing what her financial condition is. (Transcript, October 18 page 52). 
To which Judge Harding responded, "Well, it doesn't show...I've ruled." (Transcript, October 18 
page 52-53). As demonstrated, inquiries were made into Mrs. Barton's ability to pay. Appellant 
12 
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also argues that the court placed Mrs. Barton in an impossible situation. "If she failed to pay Mr. 
Barton, she would be in continued contempt. If she failed to pay the Special Master, she would be 
found in contempt for failing to cooperate with the Special Master." (See, Appellant's Brief, page 
16). This statement is also incorrect. Mr. Barton pre-paid the Special Master start-up fees to allow 
the Special Master to begin working with both Mr. and Mrs. Barton. To date, Mrs. Barton has not 
paid her portion of the fees. Appellant's argument that she is unable to incur the cost of the Special 
Master is an attempt to shift the focus from being unwilling to pay to being unable to pay. Appellant 
is attempting to extract sympathy for her position and cloud the issue of her wilful disobedience of 
the court order. 
A contempt finding was proper in this case considering Mrs. Barton's actions. The court 
may find a party in contempt if there is a continued disregard of court orders. Kelly v. Dranev 
established that contempt may be found when one party exhibits a "consistent refusal to follow the 
direct court order." 754 P. 2d 92,95 (Utah App. 1988). Had Mrs. Barton put forth every reasonable 
effort to comply with the court order and still failed to do so, she may not be guilty of contempt on 
account of that failure. Myers v. Myers, 768 P. 2d 979 (Utah App. 1989). Nevertheless, this was 
not the case with Mrs. Barton who has made no visible attempt to comply with the court order-even 
after being found in contempt of court. Prior to being served notice of the August 11 hearing, Mrs. 
Barton had written to Mr. Barton's attorney wherein she states she was "agreeable to John's request 
to make up visitation." (Transcript, October 18 page 119). Now, when she was served with the 
August 12 order, she still did nothing to allow visitation. To date, Mrs. Barton still has not made 
an effort to comply with the court order and this appeal is yet another way to avoid her 
responsibilities. 
13 
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Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure allows the court to award attorney's 
feels and costs as a sanction for a frivolous appeal or for delay. In Porco v. Porco, 752 P. 2d 365 
(Utah App. 1988) this court ruled sanctions should be imposed for a frivolous appeal when: 
An appeal is obviously without merit and has been taken with no 
reasonable likelihood of prevailing, and results in delayed 
implementation of the judgement of the lower court; increased 
costs of litigation; and dissipation of the time and resources of the 
law court. 
The Porco court so ruled even though it "recognize[d] that sanctions for frivolous appeals should 
only be applied in egregious cases, lest there be an improper chilling of the right to appeal erroneous 
lower court decisions." 
Here, Respondent seeks an award of his reasonable attorneys fees incurred in this appeal 
under Rule 33 (a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, as this appeal is frivolous as defined 
by Porco. Under this rule, Respondent seeks either the entire amount of his reasonable fees or such 
amount as may be determined to have been incurred for that portion of the appeal that this court 
finds to be frivolous, if the court finds the appeal only partially frivolous. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court exercised appropriate jurisdiction since this was a contempt and sanctions 
issue and not one of custody. Furthermore, the California and Utah courts agreed upon jurisdiction 
for contempt. The Parental Kidnaping Protection Act does not apply to matters of contempt and 
should, therefore, be disregarded. Moreover, the decision to exclude hearsay evidence was 
appropriate as no good faith defense can be asserted to justify Mrs. Barton's actions. Mrs. Barton 
14 
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wilfully refused to comply with the court order and was not prejudiced by the judge's decision to 
exclude the testimony. Further, Respondent should be awarded fees and costs as Appellant is filing 
a frivolous appeal and for delay. 
The judgement of the trial court should not be reversed. 
DATED this "Zi^day of July 2000. 
DANA D. BURROWS 
Attorney for Respondent-Appellee 
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DANA D. BURROWS - 5045 ^ - 5 ^ ** l ^ 
Attorney for Respondent 
1149 West Center 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Telephone: (801) 222-9700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RHONDA LYNN CAMERON, 
BARTON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JOHN KIMBALL BARTON, 
Respondent. 
ADDENDUM TO DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 954400090 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
The above-entitled matter having come before the court by way of Petitioner's Complaint for 
Divorce and the parties having entered into a stipulation, which stipulation is approved by the court 
and the court being fully advised in the premises, and having entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, now makes the ADDENDUM TO DECREE OF DIVORCE AS FOLLOWS: 
ADDENDUM TO DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. The parties were previously divorced on April 9, 1997 after the court entered an order 
granting bifurcation allowing the Respondent to proceed with the divorce with all remaining issues 
reserved for trial. 
2. The parties have entered into a stipulated agreement incorporating: 
A. the terms and conditions of Dr. Jay Jensen's custody evaluation and 
addendum dated August 13, 1997 and October 18, 1997, respectively, and 
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child advocate and an arbitrator on behalf of the children and will be able to work 
with each parent to improve the parties' post divorce relationship. 
v. The children should maintain their residence with their mother in the 
state of California. Consideration should be given to maintaining an area in which 
to live so that the children's relationship with their father is not compromised by 
frequent moves by the mother. 
vi. Mr. Barton should maintain child oriented visitation with his children. 
He should sustain frequent contact with them, but do so respecting the children's 
developing interests. For instance, on visitation weekends where a child has a 
scheduled soccer game he should facilitate the child's and his own attendance to the 
game. In this regard, Petitioner should take care not to schedule activities which 
compete with the children's time with their father. 
vii. Pursuant to (30-3-33) Of Utah statute the following is agreed: 
a. Special consideration shall be given by each parent to make 
the child available to attend family functions including funerals, weddings, 
family reunions, religious holidays, important ceremonies and other 
significant events in the life of the child or in the life of either parent which 
may inadvertently conflict with the visitation schedule. 
b. The custodial parent shall have the child ready for visitation 
at the time he is to be picked up and shall be present at the custodial home or 
shall make reasonable alternate arrangements to receive the child at the time 
he is returned. 
c. The court (including the Special Master) may make alterations 
3 
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than surrogate care and the court (including the Special Master) shall 
encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing the noncustodial parent, if 
willing and able, to provide child care. 
k. The custodial parent shall provide all surrogate care providers 
with the name, current address and telephone number of the non-custodial 
parent and shall provide the noncustodial parent with the name, current 
address and telephone number of all surrogate care providers unless the court 
(including the Special Master) for good cause orders otherwise. 
I. Each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major 
religious holidays celebrated by the parents, and the parent who celebrates a 
religious holiday that the other parent does not celebrate shall have the right 
to be together with the child on the religious holiday. 
B. Unless, and until, modified by the Special Master, Mr. Barton should 
maintain Utah Statutory Visitation with the children expanded during the alternating 
weekends in lieu of any midweek visit to commence on Thursday at the conclusion of school 
(or at the same time when school is not in session) with the pick-up to occur at the school, 
and/or preschool, and run through Monday morning when school recommences with the 
drop-off to occur at the school and/or preschool. When school is not in session, the same 
visitation is to be maintained with pick-up and drop-off to occur at another arranged location. 
The Petitioner will notify the Respondent at least fifteen (15) days in advance of any change 
in school, or preschool location. 
i. Alternating weekends, as defined above, beginning on the first 
weekend after the entry of the decree and continuing each year; 
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until 11:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
f. Veteran's Day holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before 
the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; and 
g. The first portion of the Christmas school vacation (which term 
means the time period beginning when the child gets out of school for the 
Christmas school break until the time the child returns to school after the 
school break, except for Christmas Eve, Christmas Day, and the New Year's 
Day), plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1:00 p.m., so long as the 
entire holiday is equally divided; 
vi. In years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is entitled 
to the following holidays: 
a. Child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3:00 p.m. 
until 9:00 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other 
siblings along for the birthday; 
b. New Year's Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the 
holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
c President's Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the 
holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
d. July 4th beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 11:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
e. . Labor Day Beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 
7:00 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which 
the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
parent; 
b. Two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial 
parent; 
c. and the remaining two weeks shall be subject to visitation for 
the custodial parent consistent with these guidelines; 
xii. The custodial parent shall have an identical two week period of 
uninterrupted time during the children's summer vacation from school for the 
purposes of vacation; 
xiii. If the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's 
extended visitation shall be one-half of the vacation time for year-round school 
breaks, provided the custodial parent has holiday and phone visits; 
xiv. Notification of extended visitation or vacation weeks with the child 
shall be provided at least 30 days in advance to the other parent; and 
xv. Telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours. 
C. A neutral site for pick-up and drop-off of the children should be established, 
if necessary. If the children transition from parent to school, pick-up and drop-off between 
parents will be reduced. However, during those times when school is not in session, an 
additional neutral site should be selected with pick-up and drop-off times to be the same as 
when the children are in school. 
i. Given the young ages of the children, there are a number of strategies 
that can be used to help them maintain a sense of constancy and to help maintain the 
relationship with their father as follows: 
a. Freedom with telephone contact, letters, cards, etc., between 
9 
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5. The Special Master may make orders resolving conflicts between the Petitioner and 
the Respondent which do not affect the court's exclusive jurisdiction to determine fundamental 
issues of custody and visitation. Each party specifically agrees that the Special Master may make 
decisions regarding possible conflict they may have. The Special Master shall have the authority 1) 
to enforce the terms of this agreement, 2) to expand the Respondent's rights of visitation, and 3) to 
resolve disputes between the parties regarding the following issues: 
A. The decision making on behalf of the parties' minor children that would 
normally be made by the parties and articulated in a parenting plan. 
The joint decision making between the parties and when and if it should be 
commenced and a parenting plan to implement it. (See 3-A of this agreement) 
C. The issue of whether or not the Petitioner shall provide the Petitioner's street 
address to the Respondent is reserved for determination by the Special 
Master. 
The issue of the religious upbringing of the children is reserved for 
determination by the Special Master including: 
i. baptism and religious training 
ii. church attendance 
Hi priesthood ordinations 
E. How to arrange the transportation between the parties for visitation including 
how to allocate the costs of transportation and the responsibility for 
participating in the transportation. 
F. Where the pick-up and drop-off of the children shall take place. 
G. The grandparent's and extended family's involvement with the exchange and 
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children in year round school, is reserved for determination by the Special 
Master. 
O. The issue of resolving, in accordance with this agreement, visitation 
scheduling conflicts that may arise between the parties shall be addressed by 
the Special Master if there is a dispute between the parties. 
P. The issue of resolving hinderance of visitation, and/or communication via 
phone, mail, and/or email shall be addressed by the Special Master if there is 
a dispute between the parties. 
Q. The issue of whether or not the Respondent is current on his child support 
obligation to allow the Respondent to claim the minor children as 
dependents, as set forth in this agreement, shall be addressed by the Special 
Master if there is a dispute between the parties. 
R. The issue of tax neutrality, as set forth in this agreement, for tax years 1996 
& 1997, as established in this agreement, shall be addressed by the Special 
Master if there is a dispute between the parties. 
S. The issue of payment of capital gains obligations, as set forth in this 
agreement, as well as any unforeseen areas of conflict regarding tax liabilities 
that may arise between the parties, shall be addressed by the Special Master 
if there is a dispute between the parties. 
T. The issue of dividing the retirement, pension or profit sharing plan shall be 
addressed by the Special Master. 
U. The issue of alternating the pre-Christmas break weekend visitation to allow 
the parent with the second half of the Christmas break to spend the weekend 
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9. It is reasonable and proper that the Respondent shall pay child support to the 
Petitioner in the amount of $1,300.00 per month for July, August and September of 1998. 
Commencing in October of 1998 and onward it is reasonable and proper that the Respondent shall 
pay child support to the Petitioner in the amount of $1,075.00 per month with one-half due on or 
before the 5th and one-half due on or before the 20th of each month. 
10. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.10, when the oldest of the children 
becomes 18 years of age or is graduated from High School during the child's normal and expected 
year of graduation, whichever occurs later, the base child support award is automatically reduced to 
reflect the lower base combined child support obligation shown in the Utah Child Support Table for 
the remaining number of children due child support. 
11. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.11, the Respondent shall be entitled to 
a fifty percent 50% abatement in child support when the Respondent has the children with him for 
twenty-five (25) out of thirty (30) consecutive days. Normal visitation and holiday visits to the 
custodial parent during said period of time shall not be considered an interruption of the consecutive 
day requirement. 
12, If the custodial parent desires to relocate more than just a few blocks, sixty (60) days 
notice of the intent to move shall be given, which would be communicated through the Special 
Master if the parties are unable to communicate directly. If a dispute over the move arises, said 
dispute shall be addressed by the Special Master. 
13, It is reasonable and proper that the Respondent shall pay alimony to the Petitioner for 
July, August and September of 1998 in the amount of $200.00 per month, "The Respondent's 
alimony obligation to the Petitioner shall forever terminate from October of 1998 onward. 
14, It is reasonable and proper that each party be responsible for one-half of the 
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divided profits of $31,500.00 that each party received and shall hold the other party harmless there 
from. 
18. During the course of the marriage the parties acquired debts and obligations, which 
debts and obligations shall be divided as follows: 
A. To the Petitioner: 
i. Petitioner's student loans after separation in September of 1995; 
B. To the Respondent: 
i. The cost for the storage unit of $2,250, 
ii. Marital debt obligations of: 
a. Credit card debt totalling $11,310, 
b. Respondent's remaining student loans of $10,760; 
C. The remaining jointly incurred debts of the marriage prior to separation, if 
there are any outstanding, shall be divided equally and the parties shall otherwise hold each 
other harmless there from. 
D. Each party shall be responsible for their own debts and obligations incurred 
subsequent to the parties' separation, which separation occurred in September of 1995. 
E. The costs of the custody evaluation shall be permanently divided as 
temporarily divided by the court and paid by the parties. 
F. Each party shall hold the other party harmless from the debts that they have 
assumed as set forth above. 
19. It is reasonable and proper that the parties divide the dependency exemptions for the 
children as follows: 
A. For the tax years 1996 and 1997, each of the parties claimed the parties' three 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
accident, eye care and orthodontia coverage that the Respondent is presently maintaining, if 
any, through July of 1998 under the Cobra plan. 
B. The Petitioner shall maintain health, dental, accident, eye care and 
orthodontia coverage on behalf of the children from September 1, 1998 and onward. The 
Petitioner states that the Petitioner will have no difficulty nor limited coverage because of 
pre-existing conditions. 
C. The Respondent may maintain additional health, dental, accident, eye care 
and orthodontia coverage on behalf of the minor children, as secondary insurance, if it is of 
benefit to the children and is economically feasible taking into consideration the monthly 
premium, with the Petitioner being responsible for one-half of the children's portion of the 
monthly premium. Irrespective of whether or not the Respondent maintains said secondary 
insurance coverage, the Respondent shall be responsible for no more than one-half of the 
remaining reasonable and necessary health, dental, accident, eye care and orthodontia costs 
incurred on behalf of the minor children, if any, that are not covered by the Petitioner's 
primary insurance including the children's portion of the monthly premium of the Petitioner's 
primary coverage. 
21. The Petitioner alleges that because of treatment on Jacob's eye that there is a bill for 
$3,000.00. Respondent shall be responsible for one-half of the bill of up to $3,000.00 with the 
Respondent's one-half maximum being $1,500.00 subject to the Petitioner providing prompt 
documentation. 
22. If medical, dental, orthodontia, eye care, or accident treatment on behalf of the 
children is of a non-emergency nature, the Petitioner is directed to wait until the Petitioner's coverage 
on the children commences on September 1, of 1998. 
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incurred in pursuing the divorce action and shall further be responsible for 33% of the Petitioner's 
attorney's fees in the amount of $3,547.00. 
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ORIGINAL 
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
FOR THE COUNTY OF VENTURA 
COURTROOM S-3 HON. GLEN M. REISER, JUDGE 
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF: ) 
RHONDA LYNN 
and 
JOHN KIMBALL 
CAMERON BARTON ) 
Petitioner, ) 
BARTON, ) 
Respondent. ) 
No. SD 022288 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Tuesday, September 7, 1999 
APPEARANCES: 
For Petitioner: JOHN CASTELLANO 
Attorney at Law 
For Respondent: SALLY DICHTER 
Attorney at Law 
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1 
1 SIMI VALLEY, CALIFORNIA; TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 199 9 
2 A.M. SESSION 
3 --00O00--
4 
5 THE COURT: Barton versus Barton. 
6 MR. CASTELLANO: Good morning, your Honor. 
7 John Castellano, from Richard Ross Associates, 
8 on behalf of the plaintiff, Rhonda Barton, who is not in 
9 court today. 
10 THE COURT: Mr. Castellano, welcome. 
11 MS. DICHTER: Sally Dichter, D-i-c-h-t-e-r, specially 
12 appearing for Mr. Barton for the sole purpose of contesting 
13 the subject matter, as well as other jurisdiction of the 
14 Court, although I think, for purposes of this ex parte, the 
15 only subject matter is jurisdiction. 
16 THE COURT: Ms. Dichter, good morning. 
17 Well, I read this file, such as it is, and I'm 
18 still a little -- I'm not confused as to what's in the file. 
19 I'm confused as to what the current status quo is with 
20 respect to where the children are. 
21 MR. CASTELLANO: Actually -- Well, the plaintiff --
22 It's a little confusing, because the plaintiff has a 
23 Complaint, too. 
24 THE COURT: Petitioner. 
25 MR. CASTELLANO: It's actually to establish and 
26 modify a Utah decree. She is the petitioner in the Utah 
27 divorce case, as well. 
28 THE COURT: I don't understand what you just said. 
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1 MR. CASTELLANO: Okay. As to the status quo, the 
2 children are with the mother. 
.3 THE COURT: They are with the mother? 
4 MR. CASTELLANO: Yes. 
5 THE COURT: Even though the Utah order says four 
6 weeks to the father? 
7 MR. CASTELLANO: That's right. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. Why is that? 
9 MR. CASTELLANO: Well, your Honor, there's --at the 
10 same time that the order says that Mr. Barton shall have 
11 visitation with them from August 16 to September 13, it also 
12 instructs Mrs. Barton to immediately contact --
13 THE COURT: The special master. Right. 
14 MR. CASTELLANO: --to resolve the custody disputes 
15 in the case. 
16 THE COURT: Right. And I have Dr. Cole's report, 
17 so -- but --So why are the kids with their mom, if there's 
18 a court order to have them with their father? 
19 MR. CASTELLANO: Because if she abides by that, the 
20 provision in the Utah order that directs the kids to be with 
21 the father, during visitation, there's a risk of harm based 
22 on Dr. Cole's recommendation. 
23 THE COURT: Dr. Cole recommends supervised visitation 
24 with the father? 
25 MR. CASTELLANO: That's all we are asking for, 
26 pending her reasonable opportunity to go to Utah to resolve 
27 this conflict in the order. 
28 THE COURT: Ms. Dichter, what's going on? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
1 MS. DICHTER: Okay. All 50 states have enacted the 
2 UCCJA for a reason. It's to avoid exactly what's happened 
3 here. 
4 There was a hearing scheduled in the State of 
5 Utah on August 11. 
6 THE COURT: Right. And the mother was a no-show. 
7 MS. DICHTER: On August 9 -- We have to back up in 
8 order to understand what's really happening here. 
9 On August 9, they came into court ex parte 
10 asking for emergency jurisdiction, which was denied. 
11 On August 11, Utah held a hearing in which she 
12 was found in direct contempt of that court, and it issued an 
13 order signed on August 12th. 
14 The children have then disappeared. In 
15 essence, they have been kidnaped. That is why Dad does not 
16 have them. 
17 Mom did nothing between August 12 and 
18 September the 1st. So to say she was waiting for Dr. Cole 
19 is absurd. She did nothing. 
2 0 Now, there is a Utah court hearing pending on 
21 October 13th. They gave her 60 days to get herself in 
22 compliance, after which they intend to sentence her. She 
23 has been held in contempt of court. 
24 In the California statutory scheme, assuming it 
2 5 were even here, once she is held in contempt, this court 
26 will not issue affirmative relief until she is in 
27 compliance. So even if we were in California, she would now 
28 be in contempt, and she is not entitled to affirmative 
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1 relief. 
2 There's a very, very limited, limited exception 
3 in the UCCJA. It says if there is extreme impending harm to 
4 the children, this court can make the barest amount of order 
5 it deems necessary to protect the children. 
6 The problem here is, if you read Dr. Cole's 
7 letter --By the way, I don't think it's a recommendation. 
8 Dr. Cole could have only seen these children under the 
9 operative court order, Utah court order. If anything, that 
10 directs us to Utah, not California. 
11 The other little glitch here, Dr. Cole was 
12 given a vacated California court order. Mr. Ross, who 
13 represents Mom, Petitioner, here, on August 9, the Court 
14 denied all ex parte relief. 
15 On August 19th, out of the blue, no notice to 
16 anyone, a court order issues staying all of Utah's action. 
17 By about August 22nd -- That was in the State 
18 of Utah, but never served on anyone else. No one else knows 
19 how this order came to be. It got served on Dad and on his 
20 counsel, who appeared because I was out of town on the 9th. 
21 It gets served on Dad and his counsel, Jim 
22 Eliaser, and Mr. Eliaser immediately faxes to 
23 Commissioner Pattie the two inconsistent orders, saying, 
24 "What's going on?" Because that destroys everything Utah 
25 has done for three years now, three years for custody 
26 litigation resulting in a contempt and a turnover order. 
27 So now what happens is, Commissioner Pattie 
28 vacates that order. He vacates it on the 26th. Jim Cole 
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1 gets it on the 1st. And if you read the first page of his 
2 report, you can see he's heavily relying upon it, and he's 
3 very confused as to his status. 
4 He never sees Mr. Barton. There's nothing in 
5 his letter indicating that Dad is physically abusive or even 
6 really emotionally abusive. The kids say he yells too much. 
7 There's no emergency. No harm to the kids. 
8 THE COURT: All of that being said, have the children 
9 started school? 
10 MR. CASTELLANO: No. That's the problem here, your 
11 Honor, is that --
12 THE COURT: Sounds like there's more than that 
13 problem, but --
14 MR. CASTELLANO: Well, the problem is, there's a Utah 
15 order in effect that gives Mr. Barton visitation, and it 
16 doesn't say anything about Dr. Cole's recommendations. It 
17 just instructs Mrs. Barton to go seek an interview with 
18 Dr. Cole. 
19 Mr. Barton has gone to the two schools that the 
20 children are supposed to enroll in, and he's provided the 
21 Utah order to the school. 
22 What we are afraid of is that he's going to go 
23 take the children away from the school under that provision 
24 of the order and take them to Utah, while the school doesn't 
25 have --
26 THE COURT: Well, there's three minors? 
27 MR. CASTELLANO: Right. 
28 THE COURT: Do they all go to the same school? 
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1 MR. CASTELLANO: Two go to one. In the 
2 declaration --
3 MS. DICHTER: The oldest goes to Los Cerritos. The 
4 other two go to elementary. 
5 THE COURT: What elementary? 
6 MR. CASTELLANO: It's --
7 THE COURT: If it's Los Cerritos, it's in T.O. 
8 MR. CASTELLANO: Right. They are both in Thousand 
9 Oaks. 
10 MS. DICHTER: Your Honor --
11 THE COURT: Hang on. 
12 MS. DICHTER: Okay. I just don't want to get --
13 THE COURT: Lang Ranch. 
14 MS. DICHTER: Lang Ranch. That's it. 
15 I just don't want to get distracted. 
16 THE COURT: I don't want to get distracted. Hang on. 
17 The two oldest to Los Cerritos. The youngest 
18 to Lange Ranch. 
19 When did school start? 
20 MR. CASTELLANO: Started on September 1st. 
21 MS. DICHTER: It started --
22 THE COURT: So we have got --we have got a lawful 
23 Utah order which says that these children are to be with 
24 their dad until -- What is it? September what? 
25 MS. DICHTER: 13. 
26 MR. CASTELLANO: 13th. 
27 THE COURT: And we also have their school. 
28 Both Petitioner and Respondent live locally; 
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1 right? 
2 MS. DICHTER: Respondent is a consultant. He is 
.3 presently under a long-term contract in Thousand Oaks, which 
4 is all within the last -- since March. Very recent. He was 
5 previously in long-term contracts in other states. His 
6 home base is Utah. 
7 MR. CASTELLANO: He's had an apartment in Ventura 
8 County. 
9 THE COURT: He's residing in Thousand Oaks right now? 
10 MS. DICHTER: Correct. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. 
12 MS. DICHTER: He is not residing. The answer is, 
13 your Honor -- Got to be very careful --
14 THE COURT: Domiciling? 
15 MS. DICHTER: Not domiciling either. 
16 He is maintaining an apartment here. 
17 While he has a home in Utah, he obviously has 
18 to have a place to live that doesn't cost as much as a hotel 
19 would cost on a long-term contract. 
20 THE COURT: So we have the kids in school. They are 
21 supposed to be with this dad. 
22 What's the problem with that? 
23 MR. CASTELLANO: The problem is Dr. Cole has 
24 recommended --
25 THE COURT: Right. But you have to have the 
26 mediator's -- you have to have the special master's report. 
27 It has to come to hearing with respect to the appropriate --
28 Well, first of all, there's a jurisdictional issue. 
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1 But even if California were to -- even if there 
2 were communication between the two courts, allowing 
3 California to begin to handle custody and visitation issues, 
4 you don't just say, "I'm relying on a report," and just take 
5 the kids. 
6 That's not appropriate, is it? 
7 MR. CASTELLANO: Well, based on Dr. --Dr. Cole says 
8 that the kids are quite fearful. There's a serious 
9 question --
10 THE COURT: Well, right. I don't care what Dr. Cole 
11 says at this point. I care what is the existent order of 
12 the Court. 
13 You don't unilaterally act without an order of 
14 the Court, do you? Or do you? 
15 MR. CASTELLANO: To the extent the Court orders, 
16 directs the parties to seek Dr. Cole's counseling on the 
17 disputed custody issues, that is part of the order. 
18 THE COURT: But it doesn't say Dr. Cole can issue 
19 court orders that supersede the existing orders, does it? 
20 MR. CASTELLANO: That's right, your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: If Dr. Cole says the kids should never 
22 see Dad again, that's not self -- that's not --it requires 
23 a hearing of some sort, doesn't it, Counsel? 
24 MR. CASTELLANO: Well, it, I think, provides a 
25 sufficient basis to protect the children pending that 
26 hearing, if Dr. Cole is saying that these kids fear -- are 
27 quite fearful of their father. 
28 I'm not saying that there should be a reversal 
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1 of custody right now. I'm just saying, just preserve that 
2 recommendation pending her ability to go to Utah to resolve 
.3 this conflict. 
4 THE COURT: It sounds to me like there's a lawful 
5 Utah order in effect, which gives Mr. Barton -- I don't know 
6 if it's visitation or joint custody during this period of 
7 time until September 13. 
8 In terms of the best interest of the minors, 
9 obviously, they need to stay in school. They can't be 
10 spirited out of the jurisdiction to Utah. 
11 But other than the fact that -- other than when 
12 they are in school, why shouldn't Dad have custody and/or 
13 physical custody and/or visitation until you have your 
14 hearing before Commissioner Pattie on the 13th? 
15 MR. CASTELLANO: Well, because Dr. Cole feels that 
16 they are --
17 THE COURT: Is there anything in Dr. Cole's report 
18 that suggests there's some emergency? 
19 MR. CASTELLANO: I mean, he says that they are all 
20 quite fearful. There's no relationship of trust. 
21 THE COURT: Right. But what precipitates that? 
22 We don't know that at this point. 
23 Is the mom telling the kids, "Hey, your dad is 
24 going to do X, Y, Z"? 
25 I mean, there really isn't -- This is a very, 
26 very brief report. What is it? Three pages? 
27 And I don't think it's appropriate for the 
28 petitioner, unilaterally, to be flagrantly violating Utah 
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1 court orders because the court-ordered special master has 
2 concerns about the temperament of the father. I think that 
3 needs to be addressed at a judicial hearing. 
4 So, Ms. Dichter, do you have any other 
5 comments? 
6 MS. DICHTER: No. That's -- That's just --
7 THE COURT: It sounds to me like these kids need to 
8 be going to school, and there needs to be an order. 
9 If there's a concern about these children being 
10 spirited out of the state pending -- you know, for the next 
11 six days, that they be ordered to attend their school here 
12 in California, but, otherwise, visitation and custody is 
13 with the father. 
14 Right? 
15 MS. DICHTER: The answer is yes. 
16 And if I were in a position to stipulate 
17 without destroying my special appearance here, father would 
18 only pick them up, take them to school. His work is here. 
19 He has no intention of going anywhere, nor has he. 
20 Despite the fact, by the way, he has this court 
21 order, when he did attempt to find the children, he brought 
22 police officers with him. He has made no effort to do 
23 anything that would embarrass his children. 
24 THE COURT: Is Mr. Barton here? 
25 MS. DICHTER: Yes. 
26 THE COURT: Mr. Barton, please step forward. 
27 And this is without your concession to this 
28 Court's jurisdiction, because I don't want you to have to 
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1 concede that, because that remains to be heard for another 
2 day. 
3 But you have no intention of taking these kids 
4 outside the jurisdiction? 
5 MR. BARTON: No. 
6 THE COURT: And you will see to it that they attend 
7 their respective schools --
8 MR. BARTON: Absolutely. 
9 THE COURT: -- until the 13th? 
10 MR. BARTON: Yes. 
11 THE COURT: I mean, I don't see any reason why we 
12 need to interfere with the lawful order of the Utah court at 
13 this point. 
14 The matter is set for September 13th on a 
15 plenary hearing before Commissioner Pattie on all kinds of 
16 issues. 
17 I'm sure Commissioner Pattie can get into the 
18 how's, when's and why's of visitation, whether it needs to 
19 be supervised or otherwise. 
20 Sounds like Mr. Barton needs to trust Dr. Cole 
21 to provide his perspective, if that hasn't been done yet. 
22 MR. CASTELLANO: It has, your Honor. 
23 He's met with Dr. Cole. 
24 MS. DICHTER: Actually, he met with Dr. Cole in May 
25 when he was seeing his children regularly, and Dr. Cole left 
26 town the moment he issued this letter, and wouldn't be back 
27 until tomorrow. 
28 So he hasn't had an opportunity to discuss this 
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1 already. 
2 THE COURT: Well, Dr. Cole's report is a 
3 recommendation to a court which is not self-enabling in and 
4 of itself. 
5 Dr. Cole's report is not before this court 
6 today. It's an emergency request that the Court act under 
7 the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, and I'm not 
8 inclined to do so. 
9 I will state that, to the extent this court has 
10 jurisdiction, it orders Mrs. Barton to turn over the 
11 children, so that Mr. Barton can have his court-ordered 
12 custody and visitation through the remainder of this 
13 purported four-week visitation, which is September 13. 
14 And Mr. Barton has been here. He's agreed he 
15 won't remove them from the jurisdiction. He is going to 
16 take them to school. 
17 So we will comply with the existing orders and 
18 have this matter heard on the 13th before 
19 Commissioner Pattie on the various other issues. 
20 MS. DICHTER: Thank you, your Honor. 
21 MR. CASTELLANO: Thank you, your Honor. 
22 MR. BARTON: Thank you. 
23 THE COURT: So the ex parte application is denied. 
24 MS. DICHTER: Thank you. 
25 THE COURT: Any question as to what I just ruled? 
26 MR. CASTELLANO: Well, so there will be a plenary 
27 hearing as to the emergency nature of this on the 13th? 
28 THE COURT: This was denied. You will have your 
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1 hearing on the 13th, which was noticed some time ago. 
2 MR. CASTELLANO: Right. 
3 MS. DICHTER: That is correct. 
4 THE COURT: And I see moving and opposing papers 
5 filed by the parties, but I think you would -- you would 
6 behoove your client to immediately turn the kids over to 
7 their father, because there's a lawful court order which 
8 compels that, and I don't think you want to continue to be 
9 in violation of a lawful order. 
10 I think the Utah court has jurisdiction at this 
11 point. Whether we have concurrent jurisdiction or whether 
12 California is going to step forward and take primary 
13 responsibility is a different question. But they also have 
14 contempt powers, and I think it's incumbent on your client 
15 to recognize that. If she doesn't want to go to jail in 
16 Utah, she ought to think about that. 
17 Okay? 
18 MR. CASTELLANO: Yes, your Honor. 
19 MS. DICHTER: Thank you. 
2 0 MR. CASTELLANO: Thank you. 
21 THE COURT: Thank you. 
22 
23 (Proceedings concluded.) 
24 
25 --00O00--
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Attorney for Respondent 
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Telephone: (801) 222-9700 
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Fourth Judicial District Court of 
Wasatch County, State of Utah 
CARMA_a. SMITH, Clerk 
^ Deputy 
•tr-
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RHONDA LYNN CAMERON, 
BARTON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JOHN KIMBALL BARTON, 
Respondent. 
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
AND JUDGEMENT 
Civil No. 954400090 
Judge Lynn Davis 
The above-entitled matter having come before the court for Order to Show Cause in Re 
Contempt on Wednesday, August 11,1999, before the Honorable Judge Lynn Davis. The Petitioner 
was not present nor was the Petitioner represented by counsel. The Respondent was present and 
represented by counsel, Dana D. Burrows. The court having reviewed the matter and being fully 
advised in the premises, now, therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Petitioner was personally and properly served with the Motion, Affidavit and Order to Show 
Cause and filed an Affidavit in Response to Respondent's Order to Show Cause Re Contempt 
but failed to personally appear or through counsel. 
2. The court finds that the Petitioner had an obligation to appear in court in person regardless 
of whether the Petitioner felt that the Fourth District Court of Wasatch County, State of Utah 
has jurisdiction over the action or not since the Decree of Divorce and the Addendum to 
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shall be heard in Provo, Utah regardless of who requests the hearing, if in fact the Respondent 
so desires said hearing to occur in Provo, Utah. 
The Petitioner shall immediately contact the Special Master, Dr. Cole, and shall immediately 
schedule an appointment and make arrangements to meet with Dr. Cole and to address the 
issues raised by the Respondent and set forth in the Addendum to Decree of Divorce entered 
by the court on December 22, 1998 and attempt to resolve said issues promptly and in good 
faith. 
Petitioner shall immediately reimburse the Respondent for the judgement amount as set forth 
in paragraph 3 above and shall further cooperate with the Respondent's makeup and extended 
visitation as outlined in paragraph 5 above and cooperate by contacting and cooperating with 
the Special Master as set forth in paragraph 7 above, all of which are part of the Finding of 
Contempt. The court will reserve implementation of penalty or incarceration pending a 
review hearing to determine the Petitioner's compliance with the terms and conditions of this 
order which review hearing shall occur 60 days or more from August 11, 1999 to enable the 
Petitioner sufficient time to comply with the court order regarding payment of the judgement 
as well as Make Up and Extended Visitation and cooperation with the Special Master. The 
review hearing will not be scheduled but can be noticed up which notice may be served upon 
the Petitioner by mailing to the Petitioner's last known address. 
DATED for this ^ day of August, 1999. 
JfUl^ELYNN'DAVIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
3 
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Order for Sanctions, entered Nov. 5, 1999 
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DANAD. BURROWS - 5045 
Attorney for Respondent 
1149 West Center 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Telephone: (801) 222-9700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RHONDA LYNN CAMERON, 
BARTON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JOHN KIMBALL BARTON, 
Respondent. 
ORDER FOR SANCTIONS 
Civil No. 954400090 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
The above-entitled matter having come before the court for Review Hearing before the 
Honorable Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr., on Monday, October 18, 1999, on what sanctions to impose 
against the Petitioner based upon the finding of contempt entered by the court in the Order on Order 
to Show Cause and Judgment on August 12, 1999. Petitioner was present and represented by 
counsel Don Petersen. Respondent was present and represented by counsel Dana D. Burrows. The 
court having heard testimony of both parties as witnesses and being fully advised in the premises, 
now, therefore, the court hereby enters its Findings and Order: 
1. The court finds that the Petitioner has continued in her ongoing willful and intentional 
disregard of the order of the court of August 12,1999 especially as it relates to the issue of 
ongoing and makeup visitation. 
2. The Petitioner shall be sentenced to two (2) days in jail at the Utah County Jail with said 
sentence to commence immediately. 
1 ?..' 
Mff\ 
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J 
DATED this 2 . 2 - ^ day of October, 1999. 
DANA D. BURROWS 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
j 
I hereby certify that on this ~&- ~ day of October, 1999,1 mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Order and Judgment, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Don R. Petersen 
120E300N 
PO Box 1248 
ProvoUT 84603 
DANA D. BURROWS 
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